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Abstract
Models of risky choice fall into two broad classes; fixed utility models that satisfy the
condition of simple scalability and everything else. While it is known that choice behaviour
can be observed that is inconsistent with all models, this has largely been based on the
construction of special cases. We use state-trace analysis and signed difference analysis to
test a set of models on a set of ecologically representative risky choices. An advantage of this
approach is that there is no requirement to posit a particular form for the error function that
links the difference in the utilities of two gambles, A and B, with the probability of choosing
A over B. We presented groups of participants with 30 variable gambles (A), each paired with
one of four fixed gambles (B). We use state-trace analysis to test the prediction of all fixed
utility models that the probability of choosing each A has the same order for all B. The results
show that this prediction is not confirmed and a more complex model is required. We then
use signed difference analysis to test two more complex models – the random subjective
expected utility model based on Decision Field Theory and a fixed utility mixture model. We
derive a key prediction from the random subjective expected utility model and show that it is
confirmed by the data. In contrast, the data are shown to be inconsistent with the fixed utility
mixture model.

Key words: risky choice, state-trace analysis, signed difference analysis, models of decision
making, fixed utility models, mixture models, Decision Field Theory, independence.
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1. Introduction
Risky choice consists of selecting the preferred gamble from a set of K different gambles.
A gamble of size n is a set of n ordered pairs,  pi , xi  , where pi  0 is the probability of
payoff, xi, and



n
i

pi  1 . If n  1 then p1  1 and the gamble is called a sure thing or

certain outcome, otherwise it is risky. Our focus in this paper on choices from sets of K  2
risky gambles each of size 2.
A fundamental feature of risky choice is that it is stochastic (Reiskamp, 2008). When
asked to choose between two or more gambles, responses vary both between different people
and within the same person at different times. Yet this stochasticity is regular – while the
probability of choosing the risky gamble, {(0.5, $1), (0.5, $0)}, against the sure thing,
{(1, $0.40)}, is close to 0.5, this probability increases monotonically as the risky payoff ($1)
increases (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). In order to capture this stochastic element, many
models of risky choice take the following general form:

P  A, B   f g  A, B  .

(1)

Here, A and B are two gambles in a binary choice and P  A, B  is the probability of choosing
A over B. Let S n   0,1 
n

function, g : Sn  Sm 

n

be the space of all possible gambles of size n. Then the

, maps a pair of gambles, A and B, of size n and m, respectively, to

a real number representing the latent preference of A over B. The function, f :

 [0,1] , is

strictly increasing in its argument and maps the latent preference of A over B to the
probability of choosing A over B. In this formulation, g can be thought of as instantiating the
deterministic component of a model of risky choice, while f instantiates its stochastic
component.
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Not all models of risky choice can be represented by Equation (1), although many can be.
One particular class of models consistent with Equation (1) is the class of fixed utility models
(Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006). In this case,

g  A, B   u  A  u  B  ,
where, u : Sn 

(2)

is a function that maps a gamble of size n to a real number representing its

latent attractiveness or utility. Many well-known models of risky choice are fixed utility
models, such as subjective expected utility theory (Edwards, 1954), prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992),
and the transfer of attention exchange model (Birnbaum, 2005).
Fixed utility models satisfy a property called simple scalability, so-called because the
effect of each gamble on choice probability depends only on a fixed value – its utility – that
corresponds to a point on a common scale (Tversky & Russo, 1969). Simple scalability
follows when g  A, B  has the general form g  u  A , u  B   and is strictly increasing in its
first argument and strictly decreasing in its second argument. This requirement is satisfied by
Equation (2). Tversky and Russo showed that simple scalability has three testable
consequences:
1. Strong stochastic transitivity1:

if P  A, B   12 , P  B, C   12 then P  A, C   max  P  A, B  , P  B, C   ,
2. Substitutability:

1

Both strong stochastic transitivity and substitutability depend on the additional assumption that P(A,A) = ½.
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P  A, C   P  B, C  if and only if P  A, B   12 .
3. Independence:

P  A, C   P  B, C   P  A, D   P  B, D 
Independence follows directly from Equations (1) and (2). Accordingly,

P  A, C   P  B, C  if and only if u  A  u  C   u  B   u  C  . If P  A, C   P  B, C  then
u  A  u  B  and u  A  u  D   u  B   u  D  for any D. Thus, P  A, D   P  B, D  for any
D. Paraphrasing Tverksy and Russo (1969), if two gambles (A and B) are ordered according
to their choice probabilities relative to some fixed standard (C) then this ordering is
independent of the particular standard. We return to this implication later.
Tverksy and Russo showed that the above three properties, along with simple scalability
itself, are essentially equivalent and “capture the same principle that pairwise choice
probabilities can be expressed as a monotone function of some underlying scale values in
such a way that if two alternatives are equivalent in one context, they are substitutable for
each other in any context” (p. 4). While violations of each of these properties have been
consistently reported in previous studies (for a summary, see Reiskamp, Busemeyer and
Mellers, 2006), this has been based on specially constructed special cases. Our aim in the
present study is to use state-trace analysis to identify whether violations of independence
arise in choices between a set of ecologically representative gambles of roughly equal
expected value.
As noted, violations of independence have been observed in selected cases. An early
example is the “Myers effect” (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). Myers and Sadler (1960)
presented three groups of people with a series of binary choices between a sure thing, with
payoffs of either +1 or 1, and a gamble consisting of an equal chance of receiving a whole
5

number payoff between –X and +X, exclusive of 1 , 0, +1. The value of X and hence the
variance of the gambles varied between groups. When the sure thing was +1, the overall
probability of choosing the gamble was greatest for the largest value of X, followed by the
intermediate value, and then the lowest value. Independence requires that the same order
should be found when the sure thing is 1 . However, although the range of probabilities of
choosing the gamble was much reduced, the opposite order was found. That is, the
probability of choosing the gamble was greatest for the smallest value of X, followed by the
intermediate value and then the largest value. A similar effect was also found by Busemeyer
(1985).
Later, Mellers and Biagini (1994) investigated violations of independence in a set of
binary choices between two sets of gambles, labelled type a and type b. Participants were
presented with 25 a gambles each paired with one of nine b gambles. The a gambles were
constructed from the factorial combination of five probabilities, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9,
with five payoffs, $13, $17, $51, $81, and $91. The b gambles were constructed from the
factorial combination of three probabilities, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, with three payoffs, $13, $51,
and $91. For each pair of gambles, participants rated their preference for the a gamble over
the b gamble on a scale from 100 (b gamble maximally preferred) to +100 (a gamble
maximally preferred). If independence is satisfied then the order of mean preference ratings
for a gambles should be the same for each b gamble2. Mellers and Biagini (1994) presented
results for three of the nine b gambles.

2

This requires a generalization of Equation (1) in which function f maps preferences onto the rating scale that

was used.
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A convenient way of examining whether the order of preferences of different a gambles is
the same for two different b gambles is to construct a state-trace plot. Let pij be the mean
preference for gamble ai over gamble b j , let N be the number of a gambles, and let

 N   1, 2,

, N . Then the set of points, P 

 p , p  : i  N  , is the state-trace for b
ij

ik

gambles, b j and bk . We say that a state-trace P is monotonically increasing (or simply
monotonic) if, for each pair of points  x, y  ,  x, y   P, if x  x then y  y and if y  y
then x  x . Clearly, if the order of preferences for a gambles is the same for two b gambles
then the corresponding state-trace must be monotonic (Dunn & Kalish, 2018; Dunn &
Anderson, 2018).
Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1 shows the results found by Mellers and Biagini in the form of three state-trace
plots for each pairwise combination of the three b gambles, labelled b1 , b2 , and b3 . Also
shown is with the best-fitting monotonically increasing curve (explained in the next section).
Based on visual inspection of these plots, each state-trace appears broadly monotonic and,
while there are apparent violations, none appear to be large. Although Mellers and Biagini
applied a statistical test, this was not specifically designed to detect departures from
monotonicity. In addition, the structures of the a and b gambles were selected by Mellers and
Biagini in order to maximize the chance of observing similarity effects (described below)
which they proposed would lead to violations of both independence and strong stochastic
transitivity. These considerations lead to two questions addressed by in the first part of the
present study. First, are apparent violations of independence statistically reliable? Second, if
they are reliable, can they be observed in relatively unselected gambles? We address these
questions using the logic and recently developed statistical machinery of state-trace analysis.
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State-trace analysis
In this section, we briefly review the logic of state-trace analysis (STA) and show how it
can be used to test for independence among binary gambles. STA is a general method to
determine properties of the latent structure that mediates the effects of one or more
independent variables on two or more dependent variables (Bamber, 1979; Dunn & Kalish,
2018). If the effects of one or more independent variables are mediated by a single latent
variable and if each dependent variable is a (possibly distinct) increasing function of that
variable then a state-trace corresponding to each pair of dependent variables will be
monotonically increasing. We apply this logic to the fixed utility model.
According to the fixed utility model, by Equations (1) and (2),
P  A, B   f g  A, B 
g  A, B   u  A   u  B 

Therefore,

P  A, B   f  u  A   u  B  
 f B  u  A 

where f B :

(3)

 0,1 is a strictly increasing function, distinct for each gamble B. Equation

(3) re-states the independence property of fixed utility models, derived in the context of STA.
Since it is a testable model under STA, we are able to apply the statistical machinery recently
developed by Kalish, Dunn, Burdakov and Sysoev (2016) to identify violations of
monotonicity and hence independence.
Kalish et al. (2016) developed a statistical test for the equality of two latent orders based
on monotonic regression. In order to demonstrate its application in the present context, we
analysed choice data from Tversky and Russo (1969). Although the stimuli used in this study
8

were not gambles, the structure of this study was comparable to that reported by Mellers and
Biagini (1994). The stimuli used by Tversky and Russo were geometric figures varying in
size and shape. Participants were asked to judge which of two pairs of figures had the greater
area. One group judged pairs of rectangles and a second group judged pairs of lenses. Each
type of figure came in two shapes; an elongated shape in which the ratio of height to width
was 5:1 and a square (or round) shape in which the ratio was 3:2. Each pair of figures
presented for judgment consisted of a standard stimulus and a variable stimulus. For each
type of figure (rectangle or lens), there were two standard stimuli; one elongated and one
square. These correspond to the B stimuli in Equation (3). There were eight variable stimuli
determined by the factorial combination of two shapes (elongated and square) and four sizes;
two smaller and two larger than the standard. These correspond to the A stimuli in Equation
(3).
Insert Figure 2 here
Each pair of variable and standard stimuli was presented three times in the form of
rectangles to 78 participants and in the form of lenses to 83 participants. The proportion of
times that the variable stimulus was chosen as the larger, summed over replications and
participants, is shown in Figure 2 in the form of two state-trace plots, one for rectangles and
one for lenses. In each plot, filled circles correspond to square variable stimuli and filled
triangles correspond to elongated variable stimuli. The x-axis corresponds to the observed
proportion of times that the variable stimulus was chosen over the square standard and the yaxis corresponds to the proportion of times that the variable stimulus was chosen over the
elongated standard.
As found by Mellers and Biagini for gambles, the overall impression is that the data, for
both rectangles and lenses, reveal a monotonically increasing trend. While there are apparent
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violations of monotonicity, they need to be supported by appropriate statistical tests. To this
end, we submitted these data to the statistical procedure described by Kalish et al. The first
step in this procedure is to calculate the fit of the best-fitting monotonic model. The
predictions of this model for both rectangle and lens groups are shown in Figure 2 by white
circles connected by straight lines. The fits of the model are given by the G2 values in each
panel. The second step is to compare the observed fit against the bootstrap distribution of
expected fits under the null hypothesis of a common latent order of conditions on each of the
two dependent variables. For both groups, the empirical p-value was found to be less than
0.001. While this is consistent with the conclusions reached by Tversky and Russo, the sizes
of observed violations of monotonicity were not large, especially for the lens group, and the
statistical significance of the result needs to be tempered by the fact that because each pair of
stimuli was presented three times to each participant the observations are not all independent.
As a result, the Type I error rate is likely to have been inflated.
The studies by Tversky and Russo (1969) and Mellers and Biagini (1994) looked for
violations of independence in the context of similarity effects. Broadly speaking, a similarity
effect occurs when discrimination between similar stimuli is enhanced relative to dissimilar
stimuli. In these two studies, similarity was manipulated by constraining similar stimuli to
vary on one stimulus property while dissimilar stimuli varied on two. An analogous example
illustrates this idea. Imagine you are asked to decide whether Vancouver (Canada) or
Portland (Oregon) is each to the north or south of Seattle (Washington). If the cities are
familiar, this would be a simple enough task because their locations differ primarily in
latitude. Similarly, many people would find it relatively easy to decide whether Paris (France)
or Barcelona (Spain) is each to the north or south of Marseilles (France) as these locations
also differ primarily in latitude. However, people may find it more challenging to decide if
Paris or Barcelona is each to the north or south of Seattle or, equivalently, if Vancouver or
10

Portland is each to the north or south of Marseilles as these comparisons involve differences
in both latitude and longitude3.
Insert Figure 3 here
Both Tversky and Russo (1969) and Mellers and Biagini (1994) found robust similarity
effects in their respective experiments. However, these effects do not in themselves guarantee
violations of independence. This can be seen in Figure 3 which plots data from Tversky and
Russo (1969). The upper two panels show the observed similarity effect separately for
rectangles and lenses. Here, the proportion of participants who selected the variable stimulus
over the standard (averaged over elongated and square standards) is plotted against the
relative area of the variable stimulus (where 1.0 is the area of the standard). Similar stimuli
have the same shape as the standard (i.e., both elongated or both square) and differ only in
area. Dissimilar stimuli have a different shape to the standard (i.e., one elongated and the
other square) as well as differing in area. The similarity effect corresponds to a steeper
function for similar stimuli compared to dissimilar stimuli. The lower two panels plot
predicted proportions derived from the best-fitting monotonic model applied to all four
dependent variables (elongated or square rectangles or lenses). By definition, the predicted
values cannot violate independence. However, it is apparent that they show essentially the
same similarity effect. In other words, the similarity effect does not necessarily lead to
violation of independence.
If similarity effects do not lead to violations of independence, the violations observed by
Tversky and Russo and by Mellers and Biagini may have more to do with the particular

3

Paris is further north of Seattle and Barcelona is further south. Both Vancouver and Portland are to the north of

Marseilles.
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stimuli used. Because both studies used stimuli generated from the orthogonal combination of
levels of two different attributes, this may have led to special circumstances in which
violations of independence could occur. For this reason, we conducted an experiment that
used STA to identify violations of independence (if any) in an ecologically representative set
of gambles.
2. Experiment
Previous studies suggest that violations of independence can be found for risky choice.
However, these occur in the context of a strong monotonically increasing trend (consistent
with independence) and lack statistical support customized to the hypothesis under test.
Furthermore, even if some observed violations are statistically reliable (as in the Myers
effect), they have been shown to occur only for a particular subset of gambles – specifically a
comparison of specially constructed gambles against a sure gain or a sure loss of equal
expected value. For these reasons, we investigated whether statistically reliable violations of
independence can be found for a set of gambles involving neither sure things nor losses that
had the following characteristics: (1) non-negative payoffs, (2) a wide range of probabilities
of winning, and (3) broadly similar expected values (within the range 1.0 to 2.2). These
characteristics guaranteed that risk and reward were negatively correlated across the gambles,
mimicking ecological choice in the environment (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014). In addition, we
examined both one-outcome and two-outcome gambles.
The fixed utility model can be used to characterize choice behavior at several different
levels. In the present study, we focus on the population level in which case the model may be
instantiated as a random utility model in which the utility of gamble, A or B, for individual I
is a random draw from an unknown distribution. Ideally, each pair of gambles would be
presented to a separate participant but, for practical reasons, each participant
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received 120 binary choices composed of 30 variable gambles each paired with one of four
fixed gambles. If independence is satisfied at the aggregate or population level then the
preference order of the 30 variable gambles should be the same for each fixed gamble. We
tested this implication using state-trace analysis.
Method
Participants. A total of 219 participants were recruited online from Southwest University
and South China Normal University in China, and were each given a small monetary
compensation (10 RMB, approximately USD1.60) for taking part in the study. They were
randomly allocated to two groups; 111 participants (78 female; Mage = 20.8  3.9 years)
received pairs of one-outcome gambles and 108 participants (87 female; Mage = 20.5  1.8
years) received pairs of two-outcome gambles. Participants were excluded if they failed to
answer a question that tested their understanding of the instructions. Fifteen participants were
excluded from the one-outcome group (final N = 96, 68 female, Mage = 20.9  4.1 years) and
14 were excluded from the two-outcome gamble group (final N = 94, 77 female, Mage = 20.6
 1.8 years). The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Institute of

Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Insert Figure 4 here
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of pairs of gambles each of size 2. That is, each gamble
was of the form, G   p1, x1  ,  p2 , x2  , where p2  1  p1 , x1 , x2  0 and min  x1 , x2   0 .
Thus, payoffs never involved losses. Participants received either one-outcome or twooutcome gambles. For one-outcome gambles, one of the payoffs was zero, that is,

min  x1, x2   0 . For two-outcome gambles, both payoffs were greater than zero, that is,
min  x1, x2   0 . There were 30 variable gambles each of which was paired with one of four
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fixed gambles. Both sets of gambles are listed in Appendix A. Figure 4 plots the probabilities
and payoffs of each gamble. As can be seen, they were selected so that probabilities and
payoffs were negatively related and that the fixed gambles were distributed more or less
evenly among the variable gambles. For variable one-outcome gambles, the mean expected
value was 16.6 (range, 5.9-29.4) while for fixed one-outcome gambles, the mean expected
value was 15.4 (range, 8.3-23.5). Two of these gambles offer a low probability (0.06 or 0.11)
of winning a large amount of money (123 or 138), while the other two offer a moderate
probability (0.49 or 0.51) of winning a moderate amount of money (32 or 48). For variable
two-outcome gambles, the mean expected value was 24.9 (range, 15.8-38.7) while for fixed
two-outcome gambles, the mean expected value was 18.7 (range, 17.8- 20.3). Two of these
offer a low probability (0.07 or 0.11) of winning a large amount of money (135 or 83) and a
high probability (0.93 or 0.89) of winning a modest amount of money (9 or 11), while the
other two offer a moderate probability (0.38 or 0.46) of winning a moderate amount of
money (21 or 23) and a moderate probability (0.62 or 0.54) of winning a modest amount of
money (16 or 18).
Procedure. All participants completed the experiment online. All 120 pairs of gambles
were presented in a random order. Participants were asked to select which gamble they
preferred to play. At the end of the experiment, they were asked to provide demographic
information (i.e., age, gender).
Results
The first step in applying STA to the present data is to make sure that each dependent
variable varies significantly between conditions. If this is not the case then the relationship
between dependent variables is trivially monotonic (Dunn & Kalish, 2018). In the current
study, this means that choice frequencies should vary between variable gambles for each
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fixed gamble. We tested this using a chi-square test for equal proportions which was highly
significant for each fixed gamble; for one-outcome gambles, each χ2(29) > 172, and for twooutcome gambles, each χ2(29) > 107.
Insert Figure 5 here
Figure 5 shows the state-trace plots for each pairwise combination of fixed one-outcome
gambles. Each point in each plot corresponds to one of the variable gambles. The axes
correspond to the proportion of participants who chose the variable gamble over the indicated
fixed gamble. The line in each plot connects the predicted points from the best-fitting
monotonic model. The fit of the model is given by the G2 value in each panel. The statistical
significance of each fit was estimated using the bootstrap resampling procedure outlined by
Kalish et al. As indicated by the asterisks in the Figure, the monotonic model can be rejected
for four of the six plots. These results should be interpreted with some caution because each
plot is not independent of the others. However, it is possible to conduct an overall test of
significance using the Kalish et al procedure. This tests whether the latent order of variable
gambles is the same for all of the fixed gambles4. The G2 value for this model was 150.2 and
was highly significant.
Insert Figure 6 here
Figure 6 shows the state-trace plots for each pairwise combination of fixed two-outcome
gambles. The monotonic model could be rejected for four of the six plots. The G2 value for
the overall monotonic model was 277.2 and also highly significant.

4

That is, whether the observed state-trace is monotonically increasing in four-dimensional space.
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Discussion
The results show that, despite an overall monotonic trend, violations of independence are
common. For both one-outcome and two-outcome gambles, each pair of fixed gambles
generated a highly significant violation of monotonicity except when the fixed gambles
themselves were similar. In our experiment, fixed gambles 1 and 3 and fixed gambles 2 and 4
for both one-outcome and two-outcome gambles, were similar in terms of probabilities and
payoffs (see Appendix A), and, for each of these pairs of gambles, no significant violations of
monotonicity were observed. This makes intuitive sense as similar fixed gambles should have
similar choice probabilities. That is, as C  B , it follows that, P  A, C   P  A, B  , for all
A.
It should be noted that the abovementioned similarity effect is not the same as that
previously reported by Tversky and Russo (1969) and Mellers and Biagini (1994). The effect
found in these studies is an example of a ‘double dissociation’ (Dunn & Kalish, 2018). As
shown in Figure 3 in relation to the results found by Tverksy and Russo, there is a large effect
of changes in area (the independent variable) of the variable stimulus when it is similar to the
standard. When it is dissimilar, the effect is reduced. This constitutes a ‘single dissociation’.
If the two kinds of standard stimulus (elongated and square) are separately identified then the
double dissociation results. That is, the effect of a change in the area of an elongated (square)
variable stimulus is greater when compared to an elongated (square) standard stimulus than
when compared to a square (elongated) stimulus. However, a double dissociation does not
necessarily lead to a departure from a monotonic state-trace plot (Dunn & Kalish, 2018;
Newell & Dunn, 2008). Everything depends on the location of the points in the state-trace
plot. Accordingly, the data may fall on a monotonically increasing curve and yet still
demonstrate a double dissociation. Such arrangements of points are apparent in Figures 1 and
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2. In the latter Figure, it is most clearly demonstrated for lens stimuli. In contrast, the
similarity effect that we have observed is based on the similarity of the fixed (or standard)
stimuli. When these are similar (in both probability of size of payoffs) then independence is
generally satisfied. Put another way, while violations of independence are likely to be
present, they are numerically smaller than those observed between dissimilar fixed gambles.
The present results show that fixed utility models are inconsistent with observed patterns
of risky choice in aggregated data. Geometrically, this means that the observed data do not
fall on a one-dimensional curve in four-dimensional state-trace plot, as required by the fixed
utility model. However, the data may conform to a higher-dimensional structure consistent
with one or more alternative models. We explore this possibility with respect to two
theoretical accounts; (1) that the observed patterns of risky choice are consistent with a
context-dependent model of choice, or (2) that these patterns of choice arise from a mixture of
individuals or subgroups whose choices each conform to a fixed utility model but with
different utility values. In the following section we test the implications of both these
accounts.
In a context-dependent model of choice, the utility of each gamble in a set is not fixed but
varies depending on the content of the set. A prominent example comes from Decision Field
Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) in which the simplest model, which Busemeyer and
Townsend call random subjective expected utility (RSEU) model, proposes that the
probability of choosing gamble A over gamble B is given by
P  A, B   f g  A, B 
g  A, B  

u  A  u  B 

 2  A   2  B 

,

(4)
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where, f , u  A and u  B  are defined as before and  2  A and  2  B  are additional
model parameters corresponding to the subjective variances of the utilities of gambles A and
B, respectively5. Busemeyer and Townsend showed that the model given by Equation (4) is
consistent with violations of independence. We show below that it is consistent with
additional structure in the data.
The fixed utility mixture model proposes that aggregated choice probability consists of a
mixture of the choice probabilities of two or more subgroups each of which conforms to the
fixed utility model. Formally,
N

N

k 1

k 1

P  A, B    pk  f  uk  A  uk  B  , subject to  pk  1,

(5)

where N is the number of subgroups (each of which may contain a single individual), pk is
the proportion of observations in subgroup k, and uk   is the corresponding utility function
for this subgroup. A model of this kind is analogous to that proposed by Regenwetter, Dana
and Davis-Stober (2011) who argued that violations of transitivity of preference judgments at
a population or aggregate level arise as mixtures of transitive preference judgments at the
individual or subgroup level. Similarly, it is readily demonstrated that choice probabilities
that satisfy independence in each subgroup can lead to violations of independence when
aggregated. An example is shown in Table 1. Consider two variable gambles, A1 and A2, and
two fixed gambles, B1 and B2. Suppose there are two equal-sized subgroups or individuals. In
subgroup 1, the utilities of the gambles are ordered, u1  A1   u1  B1   u1  A2   u1  B2  .

5

The model may also include a parameter for the subjective covariance of the utilities of the gambles. For

present purposes, we assume that this is equal to zero.
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Independence is satisfied because P  A1 , B1   P  A2 , B1  and P  A1 , B2   P  A2 , B2  . In
subgroup 2, the utilities are ordered, u2  A2   u2  B2   u2  A1   u2  B1  and independence is
satisfied because P  A1 , B1   P  A2 , B1  and P  A1 , B2   P  A2 , B2  . However, as the
illustrative figures in Table 1 show, independence is not satisfied in the aggregate.
Insert Table 1 here
Both the RSEU model and the mixture model are consistent with violations of
independence. Because both contain more than one free parameter, in order to test them
against the data, it is necessary to go beyond state-trace analysis. To do this, we apply signed
difference analysis.
3. Signed difference analysis
Signed difference analysis (SDA) was first proposed by Dunn and James (2003) and
recently extended by Dunn and Anderson (2018). It can be viewed as a generalization of
state-trace analysis to models having more than one free parameter or latent variable. SDA is
based on the observation that a model can be tested if it partitions the set of sign vectors6 into
a permitted set and a forbidden set that are invariant under all possible monotonic
transformations of the dependent variables (see Appendix C for examples). A signed
difference vector is a sign vector consisting of the signs of the differences on each dependent
variable between two different conditions. If the model is consistent with the data then each
observed signed difference vector should be an element of the permitted set (subject to
measurement error). In the present case, there are four dependent variables – the observed
proportion of times that a variable gamble is selected over each of the four fixed gambles –

6

A sign vector is a vector in which each component is an element of the set, {+, -, 0}.
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and 30 experimental conditions corresponding to the set variable gambles. Accordingly, there
are 34 = 81 distinct sign vectors and 435 possible signed difference vectors corresponding to
each pairwise combination of variable gambles.
State-trace analysis is a special case of SDA in which the model has one latent variable.
Accordingly, such a model also partitions the set of sign vectors into permitted and forbidden
sets. With two dependent variables (corresponding to two fixed gambles), there are 32 = 9
possible sign vectors. The fixed utility model requires that the preference order of two
variable gambles be the same for any fixed gamble. Consider two variable gambles, A1 and
A2 , each paired with two fixed gambles, B1 and B2 . Accordingly, if P  A1 , B1   P  A2 , B1 

then P  A1 , B2   P  A2 , B2  . Let y1   P  A1 , B1  , P  A1 , B2   and y 2   P  A2 , B1  , P  A2 , B2  
be the vectors of observed choice probabilities of, respectively, the variable gambles A1 and
A2 over each of the fixed gambles B1 and B2 . Then sign  y1  y 2  is the signed difference

vector between conditions defined by A1 and A2 and, according to the fixed utility model, is
an element of the set,

 0,0 ,  0,   ,  0,  ,  ,0 ,  ,0 ,  ,   ,  , ,
called the permitted set of the model. The remaining set of sign vectors,

 ,  ,  ,   , is

the forbidden set, so called because the fixed utility model (in this case) is refuted if a signed
difference vector is found (subject to measurement error) that is an element of this set.
Any model that uniquely partitions a set of sign vectors into a permitted set and a
forbidden set is said to be orthomestic (Dunn & James, 2003) and is associated with a unique
oriented matroid (Dunn & Anderson, 2018). For present purposes, an oriented matroid may
be viewed as a mathematical object that characterizes properties of a vector subspace that are
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invariant under arbitrary monotonic transformations of the dimensions of the embedding
space. An oriented matroid may be defined in several different ways in terms of different sets
of sign vectors which, in turn, can be derived from a particular sign vector called the
chirotope (Björner, Las Vergnas, Sturmfels, White & Ziegler, 1999). The chirotope of a
vector space is defined as follows.
Let V 

n

and let V   v1 ,

be an m-dimensional vector subspace, m  n . Let v1 ,

, vm  be a basis of V

, v m  be the corresponding n  m matrix. Then V is called the column space

of V. Let I  i1 , i2 ,



be the set of m-subsets of  n ordered lexicographically. An m-subset

of  n is any selection of m distinct elements of  n . For example, if m = 2 and n = 4 then

I  1, 2 , 1,3 , 1, 4  ,  2,3 ,  2, 4  , 3, 4  . The components of each element of I are ordered
from smallest to largest and the elements themselves are ordered lexicographically,
increasing on the first component then the second and so on. Let ik be the kth element of I
and let Vik be the m  m sub-matrix (i.e., minor) of V with rows indexed by ik . Let

:

nm

 , , 0 be the function,
I



  V   sign det  Vi  ,det  Vi  ,
1

2

.

(6)

Then   V  ,   V  is called the chirotope7 of V.
Dunn and James (2003) showed that a model is orthomestic if the chirotope of the
column space of its integral Jacobian matrix is unique. The integral Jacobian matrix of a

7

The term chirotope is part of oriented matroid theory. Dunn and James (2003) referred to it as the signed

Grassmann coordinates of a matrix.
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m

model is defined as follows. Let G be a convex subset of

and let g : G 

n

, m  n , be a

multivariate function. Let x, x  G and let Dg  x  be the Jacobian matrix of g at x . The
Jacobian matrix at x is the n  m matrix of partial derivatives of each component of g with
respect to each component of x. Let   v   x   x  x  v be a straight path from x to x in G.
Then
g  x   g  x    Dg    v   dv  x  x 
1

0

 D g  x, x  x  x 

.

The matrix, D g  x, x  , is the integral Jacobian matrix from x to x .
Signed difference analysis of random subjective expected utility theory
The RSEU model given by Equation (4) has two free parameters, u  A and  2  A ,
respectively the utility and subjective variance of the utility of gamble, A. As presented by
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993), each of these is in turn a function of the probabilities and
payoffs of the respective gambles. Let A   p1 , x1  ,

,  pn , xn  be a gamble of size n. Then

there are functions, u   and  2   such that,
u  A   u  p1 ,



2

 A     p1 ,
2

, pn , x1 ,
, pn , x1 ,

, xn 
, xn 

.

However, in line with our current approach, we make no assumptions concerning the nature
of these functions. Rather, we treat the model parameters, u  A and  2  A , as independent
latent variables. W note that any prediction based on this assumption will also apply to any
constrained version of the model. Accordingly, we parametrize the RSEU model as follows,
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P  A, Bi   f gi  a, s 
g i  a, s  

a  bi
s  ti

(7)

Where, f   f1 , f 2 , f3 , f 4  is a multivariate function with monotonically increasing
components, a 

is the utility of variable gamble A, s 

utility of A, bi 

is the utility of fixed gamble Bi , and ti 



is the subjective variance of the


is the subjective variance of

the utility of Bi , for i   4.
Analysis of the integral Jacobian matrix of the RSEU model given in Equation (7) shows
that it is orthomestic for almost all a 

and s 



(for proof, see Appendix B). We also

confirmed this result through numerical simulation. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the
chirotope of the column space of the integral Jacobian matrix of the model depends only on
the utilities of the fixed gambles corresponding to bi in Equation (7). Let g   g1 , g2 , g3 , g4 
be the multivariate function with each g i is defined by Equation (7). Let x  [a, s] and

x   a, s  be two sufficiently distinct parameter vectors and let D g  x, x  be the integral
Jacobian matrix of g from x to x . Let I   1, 2 , 1,3 , 1, 4 , 2,3 , 2, 4 , 3, 4  be the set
of 2-subsets of [4] ordered lexicographically and let ik   qk , rk  be the kth element of I.
Then, according to the RSEU model, the chirotope of the column space of D g  x, x  is the set

  D g  ,   D g  where



  D g   sign  br  bq  ,  br  bq  ,
1

1

2

2

.

To illustrate, if u  B3   u  B1   u  B2   u  B4  then   D g    , , , , ,   .
Insert Table 2 here
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In the experiment described earlier, participants were never presented with pairs of fixed
gambles. However, an order on the utilities these gambles can be obtained from the number
of times that a variable gamble is selected over each fixed gamble. That is, if u  Bi   u  B j 
and  2  Bi    2  B j  then P  A, Bi   P  A, B j  , for any variable gamble, A. Accordingly,
for each pair of fixed gambles, Bi , B j , we calculated the proportion of times that
P  A, Bi   P  A, B j  across the set of 30 variable gambles, A. Table 2 presents the results

separately for one-outcome and two-outcome gambles. The results for one-outcome gambles
are reasonably straightforward and are consistent with the order (3,1,2,4) .That is,

u  B3   u  B1   u  B2   u  B4  . The results for the two-outcome gambles are less clear cut
but are most consistent with the order (1,3,4,2). That is, u  B1   u  B3   u  B4   u  B2  .
Insert Table 3 here
A given 4  2 matrix may be associated with any of 24 distinct chirotopes that contain
only non-zero components8. This is because not all 25 = 32 combinations of + and – are
possible9. Each chirotope defines an oriented matroid associated with an equivalence class of
two-dimensional vector subspaces of

4

. Of the 24 chirotopes, 12 are consistent with a total

order (and its opposite) on the utilities of the four fixed gambles. The oriented matroids
associated with these chirotopes are called acyclic (Björner et al., 1999). The remainder are
called cyclic and involve one or more intransitivities. For example, the chirotope,  ,    ,

8

In the present case, a zero component indicates the unlikely possibility that two fixed gamble utilities are

exactly equal.
9

While the chirotope in question has six components, only five are free to vary under the set of constraints

called the Grassmann-Plücker relations.
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   , , , , ,   , requires that u  B1   u  B2  and u  B2   u  B4  , but u  B1   u  B4  .
Each of the 12 acyclic chirotopes can be paired with one of the 12 cyclic chirotopes that are,
in a particular sense, orthogonal to each other10. Table 3 lists each pair of chirotopes
corresponding to acyclic and cyclic oriented matroids, respectively, and the order of the
utilities of the four fixed gambles associated with each acyclic oriented matroid.
Insert Figure 7 here
Using a modification of the procedure used by Kalish, Dunn, Burdakov and Sysoev
(2016) we fit the model corresponding to each chirotope to data from both the one-outcome
and two-outcome sets of gambles (for a similar application of this algorithm, see Stephens,
Dunn and Hayes, 2018). In brief, each chirotope defines a distinct oriented matroid which, in
turn, partitions the set of sign vectors into permitted and forbidden subsets as described by
Dunn and Anderson (2018). As a further illustration, Appendix C lists the sets of permitted
and forbidden sign vectors associated with three different chirotopes. To fit a given chirotope
(so to speak), optimal predicted values are sought that are as close to the observed data as
possible (in a weighted least squares sense) under the restriction that each predicted signed
difference vector is an element of the permitted set of the associated oriented matroid11.
Given that we have identified a preference order for the four fixed one-outcome and the four
fixed two-outcome gambles, the RSEU model predicts that the chirotopes consistent with
these orders will fit best. The results are shown in Figure 7 which graphs the observed fit

10

Specifically, the subspaces associated with the pair of chirotopes are orthogonal.

11

Because of the large number of conditions (30 variable gambles), in order to avoid combinatorial explosion, it

was necessary to use an approximate version of the model fitting procedure (as also used by Stephens et al.,
2018).
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value (G2) associated with each chirotope to both one-outcome and two-outcome gambles.
Bars marked by an asterisk indicate that the observed fit value is significantly greater than
zero (p < 0.05), based on the bootstrap test developed by Kalish et al. (2016). This reveals
that the fits of all chirotopes associated with a cyclic oriented matroid are significantly greater
than zero. For one-outcome gambles, the predicted order was (3,1,2,4). Numerically, the bestfitting acyclic chirotope was number 4, consistent with the order (3,1,2,4) or its opposite (see
Table 3). Slightly greater fit values were found for chirotope numbers 3, 8 and 9 which
correspond to the orders (3,1,4,2), (1,3,4,2), and (1,3,2,4) (and their opposites), respectively.
For two-outcome gambles, the predicted order was (1,3,4,2). Numerically, the best-fitting
chirotope was number 3 (3,1,4,2), closely followed by number 8 (1,3,4,2).
Discussion
Our earlier application of state-trace analysis to the aggregated data from one-outcome
and two-outcome gambles showed that these data are not consistent with the predictions of
the fixed utility model. However, application of signed difference analysis revealed that these
data are nevertheless consistent with several two-dimensional state-traces, each characterized
by its corresponding chirotope. The properties of this set of two-dimensional structures
constitutes a regularity with which any viable model of risky choice needs to be consistent.
Second, the two-dimensional properties of the data were found to be broadly consistent
with the predictions of the RSEU model based on Decision Field Theory. While this is a
remarkable and unexpected result, it requires two caveats. First, the predictions derived from
the RSEU model are based on an approximation that does not always hold when there are
small differences between the utilities of fixed gambles. For the present set of stimuli, there
are indications that the utilities of fixed gambles 1 and 3 and of gambles 2 and 4 respectively
differ by relatively small amounts (for both one-outcome and two-outcome sets). To the
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extent that these differences are sufficiently small, violations of the predicted order may
occur. The second caveat is that the predictions may not be unique to the RSEU model. It is
possible that other models may make the same prediction. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Signed difference analysis of the fixed utility mixture model
In this section, we apply a form of SDA to the fixed utility mixture model given in
Equation (5). Our approach is to determine whether and under what conditions this model is
consistent with the two-dimensional regularity that emerged from the signed difference
analysis of the RSEU model. We were not able to repeat the analysis of the mixture model in
terms of the properties of the integral Jacobian matrix because this component of the model
cannot be separated from the (unknown) monotonic function. As a consequence, we rely on
simulations.
We investigated the predictions of the mixture model in the following way. For each of
N  1 subgroups, we generated 30 variable gamble utilities and compared them to each of

four fixed gambles. Let aik be the utility of variable gamble i for subgroup k and let b jk be
the utility of fixed gamble j for subgroup k. Each of these utilities was modelled as an
independent draw from a standard normal distribution. We also investigated other plausible
distributions (e.g., logistic) and found qualitatively similar results. The number of subgroups,
N, was varied over a large range. Again, essentially the same results were found for all values
of N  1 although as N increases, the differences between conditions become smaller and G2
values approach zero. Lastly, the mixture probabilities were all equal. That is, pk  1/ N for
each subgroup k.
For each value of N, each combination of fixed and variable gamble utilities was
converted into choice frequencies (based on 100 notional participants) using Equation (5) and
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the normal cdf substituting for f . These simulated data were then fit by models corresponding
to each of the 24 chirotopes discussed earlier. We were primarily interested in comparing two
different scenarios in which the values of the variable gamble utilities were uncorrelated
between subgroups. In the first scenario, fixed gamble utilities were also uncorrelated
between subgroups while in the second scenario, they were constrained to be in the same
order in each subgroup. In practice, this is equivalent to a re-ordering of the fixed gamble
utility values generated from the first scenario. For ease of comparison to the results shown in
Figure 7, the order of fixed gamble utilities was chosen to be the same as that found for oneoutcome gambles. That is, (3,1,2,4).
Insert Figure 8 here
Figure 8 summarizes the key result. It shows the average fit values (G2) for each acyclic
chirotope under the two scenarios for N  10 subgroups. The fits of the 12 cyclic chirotopes
are not shown as they are uniformly poor and mask the differences between the fits of the 12
acyclic chirotopes. The choice of N  10 is also arbitrary as similar results were found for
any N  1 . The black bars show the fits of each chirotope under the first scenario in which
the values of the fixed gamble utilities varied randomly between subgroups. It shows that
each chirotope fits the data more or less equally. The gray bars show the fits of each
chirotope under the second scenario in which the values of the fixed gamble utilities were
constrained to have a common order (3,1,2,4) between subgroups. In contrast to the first
scenario, it is clear that there are substantial differences in fit between the 12 acyclic
chirotopes. The best fit is obtained for chirotope number 4 which corresponds exactly to the
fixed gamble utility order (3,1,2,4) (and its opposite, see Table 3). There is also a graded
increase in fit values for chirotopes containing increasing numbers of pairwise inversions.
Thus, chirotope numbers 3, 6, 8, and 9, each of which is one pairwise inversion from the
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target order, (3,1,2,4), all have relatively low fit values. This pattern is qualitatively similar to
that observed in the experiment and shown in Figure 7.
Discussion
Signed difference analysis of aggregated data from both one-outcome and two-outcome
gambles revealed an underlying two-dimensional structure consistent with the predictions of
the RSEU model (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). We also investigated whether this pattern
was consistent with a fixed utility mixture model in which violations of independence at the
aggregate level, as revealed by state-trace analysis, arise as a consequence of combining
choice probabilities across different subgroups each of which conforms to the fixed utility
model with differing utility values. While summing over different subgroups easily leads to
violations of independence at the aggregate level, our analysis of simulated data revealed that
the critical two-dimensional structure emerged only when there was a common order of fixed
gamble utilities across subgroups. Yet, while consistent with the observed data, this poses a
problem for the mixture model. The problem is that if there is a common order of the fixed
gamble utilities across subgroups then there is no reason that there should not also be a
common order of the variable gamble utilities. That is, if subgroups agree on the utility order
of one set of gambles, they should agree on the utility order of all gambles. But if this were
the case then the mixture model is no longer a mixture and predicts the one-dimensional
state-trace that has been ruled out by the earlier state-trace analysis.
Our simulation juxtaposed two extreme scenarios – uncorrelated fixed gamble utilities in
the first scenario and perfect ordinal correlations in the second scenario. We have not
explored all possible mixtures of orders and it is possible that a combination exists that is
consistent with the observed data. However, this would offer an unconvincing post hoc
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explanation that would depend critically upon a highly fortuitous combination of factors. In
contrast, the RSEU model predicts almost exactly the pattern of data that is observed.
4. General discussion
In this paper we have tested three different models of risky choice using the related
methodologies of state-trace analysis and signed difference analysis. In the first part, we used
state-trace analysis to test for independence, a key property of fixed utility models. The
singular advantage of this approach is that it enabled us to examine a set of ecologically
relevant gambles and to test model predictions without having to specify the form of a
specific monotonically increasing link function. This overcomes the problem of fitting
models in which this function may be misspecified. For example, Reiskamp (2008) fit models
of risky choice to data after assuming a stochastic link function, corresponding to a particular
form of f in Equation (1), and found mixed results. While a fixed utility model (Cumulative
Prospect Theory) fit the data reasonably well and outperformed a stochastic variant of the
Priority Heuristic model (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006), it was itself
outperformed by Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). While these results
are important they are limited by the fact that, in each case, the fit of the model depends on
the appropriateness of the assumption of the stochastic link function.
Our application of state-trace analysis also showed that violations of independence do not
depend on the presence of a similarity effect, as proposed by Mellers and Biagini (1994).
Instead, they appear to be due to context effects arising from the component gambles
themselves. This is supported by the finding that violations of independence (i.e., a nonmonotonic state-trace) were not observed between pairs of similar fixed gambles (between
gambles 1 and 3, and between 2 and 4).
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In the second part, the question of how best to account for the observed data was explored
using signed difference analysis. Two models were compared; the random subjective
expected utility model derived from Decision Field Theory and a fixed utility mixture model.
We interpreted the RSEU model as a context-dependent model of the data at an aggregated or
population level. In contrast, according to the fixed utility mixture model, violations of
independence at the population level arise as a mixture of heterogeneous subgroups each of
whose pattern of choices is consistent with the fixed utility model. Consistent with previous
demonstrations (Prince, Brown & Heathcote, 2012), we showed that such aggregation (or
averaging) of underlying one-dimensional state-traces can lead to the observation of higherdimensional state-traces.
We investigated the structure of the higher-dimensional state-trace using signed
difference analysis. Based on the theory of SDA, we analyzed the integral Jacobian matrix of
the RSEU model and derived the prediction that it is almost always consistent with a twodimensional structure (in four-dimensional dependent variable space) characterized by an
oriented matroid whose chirotope is determined by the order of the utilities of the fixed
gambles. This is an elegant and surprising prediction which, perhaps even more remarkably,
was found to be broadly consistent with the observed data both for one-outcome and twooutcome gambles. Through simulation, we demonstrated that this structure is also consistent
with the mixture model but only under the assumption that the order of the fixed gamble
utilities is the same for each component subgroup. While this is possible, it is not a natural
prediction of this model and implies that the order of the variable gamble utilities should also
the same for each subgroup. This, in turn, implies contra the previous state-trace analysis that
independence is not violated at the aggregate level.
Our application of STA and SDA is novel and while the results are suggestive, it is clear
that further investigations are warranted. An important outstanding question concerns the
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relationship between models that account for data at either population, subgroup, or
individual levels. While we have found evidence consistent with the RSEU model at the
population level, we cannot assume that this model also accounts for data at other levels of
aggregation. Having said that, it is often difficult to obtain to obtain multiple independent
responses to the same choice pairs at the individual level (Roelofsma & Read, 2000).
Furthermore, determining the consistency of behaviour at the individual level invites the
question of whether this may change over time or as a result of experience. For example,
risky choice has been shown to be more consistent with expected utility or other fixed utility
models if choices are offered on multiple occasions, either in fact (Baucells & Villasís, 2010;
Hey, 2001) or by instruction (Keren, 1991; Rao, Dunn, Zhou & Li, 2015). The methods we
have used in the present study could be used to investigate the viability of different classes of
model under these conditions.
Our application of STA and SDA provides both a description of the data and a procedure
for deriving predictions from models. As a description of the (aggregated) data, STA revealed
that its structure was more complex than the unidimensional prediction of fixed utility
models. Furthermore, SDA revealed that these data were well-described by a relatively
simple (i.e., orthomestic) two-dimensional structure. This may provide a template for future
investigations of risky choice or other kinds of judgment – given an n-dimensional dependent
variable space, we can ask what is the smallest dimensionality that is consistent with the data.
In addition, through the analysis of chirotopes corresponding to different data structures, it is
possible to determine a regularity or set of regularities against which different models may be
tested. The theory of SDA can then be used to derive predictions from models either
analytically (if amenable) or through simulation. This, we suggest, offers a powerful tool for
investigating the structure of models under monotonicity.
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5. Appendix A - Probabilities (p1) and payoffs (x1, x2) for one-outcome and twooutcome gambles.
Gamble
One-outcome

Two-outcome

Type

No.

p1

x1

p1

x1

x2

Variable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

0.04
0.27
0.32
0.47
0.36
0.69
0.56
0.45
0.83
0.05
0.25
0.31
0.46
0.37
0.67
0.58
0.73
0.83
0.17
0.15
0.72
0.03
0.28
0.34
0.48
0.33
0.71
0.53
0.63
0.82

161
102
64
50
47
22
27
17
9
156
98
61
52
56
23
27
18
11
102
121
21
198
105
67
56
66
23
29
17
10

0.05
0.11
0.23
0.27
0.32
0.41
0.49
0.56
0.61
0.71
0.09
0.18
0.26
0.35
0.44
0.54
0.67
0.76
0.86
0.92
0.07
0.13
0.25
0.34
0.45
0.57
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.97

165
138
102
98
89
61
51
42
36
13
127
107
82
71
57
45
31
27
15
12
140
109
56
43
32
28
21
17
15
16

8
7
12
13
15
16
13
11
12
27
11
12
13
14
13
12
13
14
28
60
8
10
11
12
13
14
20
28
40
70

Fixed

1
2
3
4

0.11
0.51
0.06
0.49

123
32
138
48

0.11
0.38
0.07
0.46

83
21
135
23

11
16
9
18
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6. Appendix B – Derivation of the chirotope of the random subjective expected utility
(RSEU) model.
We parameterize the RSEU model as follows:

P  A, Bi   f gi  a, s 
g i  a, s  

a  bi
s  ti

(A.1)

Where, f   f1 , f 2 , f3 , f 4  is a function with monotonically increasing components, a 
the utility of variable gamble A, s 
the utility of fixed gamble Bi, and ti 



is

is the subjective variance of the utility of A, bi 


is

is the subjective variance of the utility of Bi, with

i   4 .
Let g   g1 , g2 , g3 , g4  and let gij   gi , g j  . Let P 





be the convex domain of gij

and let p   a, s  be an element of P. The Jacobian matrix of g ij at p is
 1
1

2
  s  ti 
Dgij  p   
1

1
 s  t j 2


bi  a



2  s  ti  
.
bj  a 

3
2
2  s  t j  
3
2

Let p0   a0 , s0  and p1   a1 , s1  be elements of P such that a0  a1 and s0  s1 . Because P
is convex, the integrated Jacobian matrix of gij from p0 to p1 is defined as

 1
1

1 dv
 0  s0  v  s1  s0   ti  2
D gij  p0 , p1   
 1
1
1 dv
 0
2
  s0  v  s1  s0   t j 

bi   a0  v  a1  a0  


dv
0 2 s  v s  s  t 23 
 0  1 0 i
 .
1 b j   a0  v  a1  a0  

dv
3

0
2  s0  v  s1  s0   t j  2 
1
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Consider the two terms in the top row of the above matrix (the other terms follow by
substitution). The first of these is



0

s

 v  s1  s0   ti  2
1

0

1

2  s0  v  s1  s0   ti  2 

dv 

 s0  s1 
0
2  z0i  z1i 

,
 s0  s1 
1

1

1

where z0i   s0  ti  2 and z1i   s1  ti  2 .
1

1

The second term is



1

0

bi   a0  v  a1  a0  
2  s0  v  s1  s0   ti 

dv

3
2





1

  s0  v  s1  s0   ti  2 3a0  s1  ti   3a1  s0  ti   3bi  s0  s1    a0  a1   s0  v  s1  s0   ti  


2

3  s0  s1 
0
1



3  bi  s0  s1   a1 z02i  a0 z12i   z0i  z1i    a0  a1   z03i  z13i 
3  s0  s1 

2

.

Consequently,
2
2
3
3
2  z0i  z1i  3  b j  s0  s1   a1 z0 j  a0 z1 j   z0 j  z1 j    a0  a1   z0 j  z1 j 
det  D gij  p0 , p1   

2
 s0  s1 
3  s0  s1 

2  z0 j  z1 j  3  bi  x0  x1   a1 z02i  a0 z12i   z0i  z1i    a0  a1   z03i  z13i 


2
 s0  s1 
3  s0  s1 

Expanding and rearranging terms, we get
det  D gij  p0 , p1    U  b j  bi   V1  V2  V3 ,

where,
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U

2  z0i  z1i   z0 j  z1 j 

 s0  s1 
2  a0  a1 
V1 
z  z1i   z0 j  z1 j   z02 j  z02i 
3  0i
 s0  s1 
2  a0  a1 
V2 
z  z1i   z0 j  z1 j   z02 j  z02i 
3  0i
3  s0  s1 
2  a0  a1 
V3 
z  z1i   z0i z1 j  z0 j z1i   z0i  z1i  .
3  0i
3  s0  s1 
2

It is clear that U  0 . Less obviously, if ti  t j then V1  V2  V3  0 and hence





sign det  D gij  p0 , p1    sign  b j  bi  . Even less obviously, if ti  t j then V1  V2  V3 and





hence, for almost all p0 , p1  P , sign det  D gij  p0 , p1    sign  b j  bi  .
The approximation, V1  V2  V3 , is shown as follows. Because V2  13 V1 , it is sufficient to
2
2
show that V3  2V2 . Noting that, z0 j  z0i  t j  ti , we want to show that

z

z  z0 j z1i   z0i  z1i 

0i 1 j

2  z0 j  z1 j 

 y j  yi .

We use the identity,
1
2

b  d  a  c   12 b  d  a  c   ad  bc ,

to give,

z

z  z0 j z1i   z0i  z1i 

0i 1 j

2  z0 j  z1 j 



z

z

z


0j

 z1 j   z0i  z1i  z0i  z1i 

0j

 z1 j   z02i  z12i 

4  z0 j  z1 j 

4  z0 j  z1 j 

z  z 
 0i 1i

 z1 j   z02i  z12i 
2

0j

4  z02 j  z12j 



z

0j

 z1 j   z0i  z1i  z0i  z1i 
4  z0 j  z1 j 

2

4

z  z 
 0i 1i
4

2

.

37

2
2
2
2
Noting that z0i  z1i  z0 j  z1 j  s0  s1  0 ,

z

z  z0 j z1i   z0i  z1i 

0i 1 j

2  z0 j  z1 j 

 14  z0 j  z1 j   14  z0i  z1i 
2



2

 14 z02 j  z02i  z12j  z12i  2  z0 j z1 j  z0i z1i 



 12  t j  ti  z0 j z1 j  z0i z1i  .
And, because z0 j z1 j  z0i z1i  t j  ti , it follows that

z

z  z0 j z1i   z0i  z1i 

0i 1 j



2  z0 j  z1 j 

 t j  ti .



Therefore, V1  V2  V3 , and sign det  D gij  p0 , p1    sign  b j  bi  holds for b j  bi
sufficiently greater than zero. To give some indication of the limits of this approximation, we
conducted the following simulation. Values of a0 , a1 , b1 and b2 were drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval  1,1 . Values of s0 , s1 , t1 and t2 were drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval  0, 2 . A sample size of 100,000 was used. The results are shown
in Figure A-1. Changes in sign between the determinant, U  b j  bi   V1  V2  V3 and
U  b j  bi  are indicated by the black points and accounted for 0.25% of observed values.

They almost entirely occur when b j  bi is within 5% of zero.

Insert Figure A-1 here
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7. Appendix C – Permitted and forbidden sets of sign vectors associated with each of
three example chirotopes (for more information, see Table 3).
Chirotope
Set

±(+,-,+,-,+,+)

±(+,+,+,-,-,+)

±(+,-,-,-,+,-)

Permitted

(0,0,0,0)
±(0,0,0,+)
±(0,0,+,-)
±(0,0,+,0)
±(0,0,+,+)
±(0,+,-,0)
±(0,+,-,+)
±(0,+,0,-)
±(0,+,0,0)
±(0,+,0,+)
±(0,+,+,-)
±(0,+,+,0)
±(0,+,+,+)
±(+,-,0,-)
±(+,-,0,0)
±(+,-,+,-)
±(+,-,+,0)
±(+,0,-,0)
±(+,0,-,+)
±(+,0,0,-)
±(+,0,0,0)
±(+,0,0,+)
±(+,0,+,-)
±(+,0,+,0)
±(+,0,+,+)
±(+,+,-,0)
±(+,+,-,+)
±(+,+,0,-)
±(+,+,0,0)
±(+,+,0,+)
±(+,+,+,-)
±(+,+,+,0)
±(+,+,+,+)

(0,0,0,0)
±(0,0,0,+)
±(0,0,+,-)
±(0,0,+,0)
±(0,0,+,+)
±(0,+,-,-)
±(0,+,-,0)
±(0,+,-,+)
±(0,+,0,-)
±(0,+,0,0)
±(0,+,0,+)
±(0,+,+,0)
±(0,+,+,+)
±(+,-,-,-)
±(+,-,-,0)
±(+,-,0,-)
±(+,-,0,0)
±(+,-,0,+)
±(+,-,+,-)
±(+,-,+,0)
±(+,-,+,+)
±(+,0,-,-)
±(+,0,-,0)
±(+,0,0,-)
±(+,0,0,0)
±(+,0,0,+)
±(+,0,+,-)
±(+,0,+,0)
±(+,0,+,+)
±(+,+,0,0)
±(+,+,0,+)
±(+,+,+,0)
±(+,+,+,+)

(0,0,0,0)
±(0,0,0,+)
±(0,0,+,-)
±(0,0,+,0)
±(0,0,+,+)
±(0,+,-,-)
±(0,+,-,0)
±(0,+,-,+)
±(0,+,0,-)
±(0,+,0,0)
±(0,+,0,+)
±(0,+,+,-)
±(0,+,+,0)
±(+,-,0,-)
±(+,-,0,0)
±(+,-,0,+)
±(+,-,+,-)
±(+,-,+,0)
±(+,-,+,+)
±(+,0,-,-)
±(+,0,-,0)
±(+,0,0,-)
±(+,0,0,0)
±(+,0,0,+)
±(+,0,+,-)
±(+,0,+,0)
±(+,0,+,+)
±(+,+,-,-)
±(+,+,-,0)
±(+,+,0,-)
±(+,+,0,0)
±(+,+,+,-)
±(+,+,+,0)

Forbidden

±(0,+,-,-)
±(+,-,-,-)
±(+,-,-,0)
±(+,-,-,+)
±(+,-,0,+)
±(+,-,+,+)
±(+,0,-,-)
±(+,+,-,-)

±(0,+,+,-)
±(+,-,-,+)
±(+,0,-,+)
±(+,+,-,-)
±(+,+,-,0)
±(+,+,-,+)
±(+,+,0,-)
±(+,+,+,-)

±(0,+,+,+)
±(+,-,-,-)
±(+,-,-,0)
±(+,-,-,+)
±(+,0,-,+)
±(+,+,-,+)
±(+,+,0,+)
±(+,+,+,+)
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Table 1: Violation of independence due to aggregation.
Option

Probability of choosing variable option

Variable

Fixed

Subgroup 1

Subgroup 2

Aggregate

A1

B1

0.2

0.7

0.45

A2

B1

0.6

0.4

0.5

A1

B2

0.4

0.6

0.5

A2

B2

0.7

0.2

0.45
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Table 2: Proportion of times that the probability of choosing a variable gamble over the
fixed gamble indicated by row is greater than the probability of choosing the same
variable gamble over the fixed gamble indicated by column.
One-outcome gambles
1
2
3
4

Two-outcome gambles

1

2

3

4

-

0.10

0.93

0.10

1

-

1.00

0.17

2

-

0.03

3

-

4

1

2

3

4

-

0.70

0.60

0.59

-

0.27

0.10

-

0.57
-
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Table 3: List of 12 pairs of acyclic and cyclic chirotopes and associated
preference orders.
Number

Acyclic
Chirotope

Preference
Orders

Cyclic
Chirotope

1

  , , , , ,  

(2,1,3,4), (4,3,1,2)

  , , , , ,  

2

  , , , , ,  

(2,1,4,3), (3,4,1,2)

  , , , , ,  

3

  , , , , ,  

(2,4,1,3), (3,1,4,2)

  , , , , ,  

4

  , , , , ,  

(3,1,2,4), (4,2,1,3)

  , , , , ,  

5

  , , , , ,  

(2,3,1,4), (4,1,3,2)

  , , , , ,  

6

  , , , , ,  

(3,2,1,4), (4,1,2,3)

  , , , , ,  

7

  , , , , ,  

(1,4,3,2), (2,3,4,1)

  , , , , ,  

8

  , , , , ,  

(1,3,4,2), (2,4,3,1)

  , , , , ,  

9

  , , , , ,  

(1,3,2,4), (4,2,3,1)

  , , , , ,  

10

  , , , , ,  

(1,4,2,3), (3,2,4,1)

  , , , , ,  

11

  , , , , ,  

(1,2,4,3), (3,4,2,1)

  , , , , ,  

12

  , , , , ,  

(1,2,3,4), (4,3,2,1)

  , , , , ,  
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10. Figure Captions
1. State-trace plots of mean preference ratings of gambles from Mellers and Biagini
(1994). Each point represents one of the 25 a gambles. The axes correspond to pairs









of b gambles; b1   0.1,$51 ,  0.9,$0  , b2   0.5,$51 ,  0.5,$0 ,

b3   0.9,$51 ,  0.1,$0 . The line connects the points predicted by the best-fitting
monotonic model.
2. State-trace plot of results found by Tversky and Russo (1969). The axes correspond to
the proportion of times that the variables stimulus, either elongated or square, was
judged larger than the standard stimulus, either elongated or square. The line connects
the points predicted by the best-fitting monotonic model.
3. Data from Tverksy and Russo (1969). The top row plots the observed proportion of
times the variable stimulus is selected over the standard stimulus for rectangles and
lenses. The similarity effect corresponds to the steeper curve associated with variable
stimuli similar to the standard compared to variable stimuli that are dissimilar to the
standard. The bottom row plots the predicted proportions derived from the best-fitting
monotonic model.
4. Plot of the probabilities and payoffs of gambles used in the present study. (a) Oneoutcome gambles; (b) Two-outcome gambles.
5. State-trace plots for each pairwise combination of one-outcome gambles from the
present study. Each point represents one of the 30 variable gambles. The axes
correspond to the proportion of participants that selected the variable gamble over the
indicated fixed gamble (range: 0 to 1). The line connects the points predicted by the
best-fitting monotonic model. The G2 value is the fit of the monotonic model. One
47

asterisk indicates that p < 0.05. Two asterisks indicate that p < 0.01. Otherwise, p >
0.05.
6. State-trace plots for each pairwise combination of two-outcome gambles from the
present study. Each point represents one of the 30 variable gambles. The axes
correspond to the proportion of participants that selected the variable gamble over the
indicated fixed gamble (range: 0 to 1). The line connects the points predicted by the
best-fitting monotonic model. The G2 value is the fit of the monotonic model. One
asterisk indicates that p < 0.05. Two asterisks indicate that p < 0.01. Otherwise, p >
0.05.
7. Fits (G2) of models determined by each pair of acyclic and cyclic chirotopes. (a) Oneoutcome data; (b) Two-outcome data. Asterisks indicate a significant difference from
zero (p < 0.05).
8. Fits (G2) of models determined by each acyclic chirotope to simulated data based on
the fixed utility mixture model with 10 subgroups.
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A-1

Plot of approximate against exact values for the determinant of the integrated
Jacobian matrix of the random subjective expected utility model. Gray points indicate
consistent signs, black points indicate inconsistent signs. Based on 100,000 samples,
0.25% were inconsistent. (a) All values; (b) Values close to zero (note change of
scale).
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